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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH D. MAACK,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, and ROBERT K. JARVIK,

No. 930064-CA
Priority 15

Defendants/Appellees.
Plaintiffs/Appellants Robert D. Maack and Judith D. Maack
"Maacks") submit the following Appellants1

Reply

(the

to Hoagland!s and

Resource Design f s Brief:
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE
The

only

determinative

constitutional

provisions,

statutes,

ordinances or rules are Utah Code Anno. § 57-1-12 (1943), attached as
Exhibit "A" and U.R.C.P. 56, attached as Exhibit "B."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment where the District Court
determined that the builder of a new house containing numerous defects
(which would cost well in excess of $100,000 to repair) was entitled to
Summary Judgment as a matter of law despite those defects.
The builder (Hoagland d/b/a Resource Design) built a home for the
original owner (Jarvik) only partly in accordance with Jarvik?s plans;
however, it was the builder who selected the materials and determined
the specific methods of construction.
Jarvik

then

sold

the

home

to

the

Maacks,

plaintiffs

here.

Approximately nine months later serious problems in the construction
began to manifest themselves (i.e., stucco cracked and fell off, roofs
and decks leaked excessive water, etc.)

Originally the builder acknowledged
defects.

responsibility to cure the

However, after working on the building for approximately one

year (and beginning to appreciate the magnitude of the problems) the
builder (Hoagland) refused to perform further work to cure the defects.
The purchasers then brought suit against the builder under the
following theories:
1.

Breach

construction

of

of

Warranty:

the

building,

In

the

rendering

design,
it

unfit

supervision
for

the

and

purpose

intended (i.e., repel the elements, habitation, etc.).
2.

Negligence:

In the selection of materials and construction

techniques utilized.
3.

Strict Liability:

selection,

application

and

Defects in the building caused by faulty
installation

of

component

parts

of

the

structure (i.e., the stucco, membranes, deck and roofing materials and
adhesives used in the construction of the walls, roofs and decks of the
building, etc.).
4.

res ipsa
5.

Declaratory Judgment:

For the application of the doctrine of

loquitur.
Negligent and/or Intentional Misrepresentation:

In that the

builder promised to cure the defects in the property at no cost to
plaintiffs, he later refused to cure the defects and sought to recover
$16,000+ for additional negligent and defective work.
The District Court has ruled that "there exists no genuine dispute
as to any material fact" in any of these causes of action and that the
defendant (builder) is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Response
1.

Breach of Warranty Claim:

There is no dispute of fact that

the building is defective in many particulars and that the cost of
2

repair will exceed $100,000,

The Court held as a matter of law that a

subsequent purchaser could not recover from the builder

for faulty

construction absent "Privity of Contract".
The Court held that unless the builder was a "builder/vendor" he
had no liability to subsequent purchasers for "economic damages" caused
by shoddy construction•
The buyers respectfully contend that the builder/vendor defense
extends

only

to defects

in design

and

not defects

resulting

from

improper manufacturing or construction techniques.
In this case the Court ignored the distinction between "design" and
"manufacturing" defects and improperly applied builder/vendor defense to
both kinds of defects.
Moreover, there is no case law in the State of Utah requiring
"privity of contract for an owner to bring action against the builder
for defective construction.

The overwhelming weight of authority in the

U.S. permits a subsequent purchaser who is damaged to sue a builder for
breach of warranty.
However, even if the Court were to determine privity of contract is
necessary.

In this case the warranty deed given by the seller (Jarvik)

to the buyers (Maacks) conveyed all right title and interest in and to
the subject property including Jarvikfs right to sue the builder for
Breach of Warranty.
2.

Negligence:

There

is

no

dispute

that

the

building

is

defective and that the plaintiffs have sustained significant economic
damages;

however,

the

District

Court

determined

that

a

negligent

building contractor is not liable to subsequent purchasers for "economic
damages" to the building occasioned by the defects in the absence of
privity.

The Court held this despite the holding in W.R.H.,
3

Inc.

v.

Economy

Builders

Chrlstensen,
3.

Supply,

633

P.2d

42

(Utah

1981)

Good

and

v.

527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974).
Strict Liability:

substantially

defective

There is no dispute that the building is

or

that

the

plaintiffs

have

sustained

significant economic damages; however, the District Court held that the
doctrine of "Strict Liability" does not apply to a building contractor
who selects and installs component parts into a structure.

The Court

held this despite the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Ernst
Inc.

v.

Economy
4.

Armco

Steel,

Builders

601 P.2d

Supply,

Hahn,

W.

152 (Utah 1979) and VI.R.H..

Inc.

v.

633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981).

Declaratory Judgment on the Application of the Doctrine of res

ipsa loquitur:

This claim merely sought a ruling by the Court that at

trial the doctrine of res Ipsa

loquitur

should be applied to the builder

since he had exclusive control over the structure at all relevant times
and was in a better position to determine why the defects existed.

The

Court's granting of defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment mooted this
issue.
5.

Negligent

and/or

Intentional

Misrepresentation:

The

subsequent purchaser (Maacks) plead that the builder had injured and
damaged

them

by

his

initial

representation

that

he

would

responsibility to cure the defects at no cost to the owners.

accept

Then after

a year of disruption, the defects were not cured and the builder sought
$16,000+ under theories of implied contract and quantum meruit.
Court held that:
2.
Plaintiffs failed to establish any facts
indicating that defendants made any material
misrepresentations
of
fact
or
otherwise.
Therefore, there is no basis for plaintiffs'
negligent
and/or intentional
misrepresentation
claim.

4

The

3.
Plaintiffs failed to establish any facts
indicating detrimental reliance by them upon
alleged representations by defendants. Therefore,
there is no basis for plaintiffs1 negligent and/or
intentional misrepresentation claim.
4.
Because there is no basis for plaintiffs1
intentional misrepresentation claim, there can be
and is no basis for plaintiffs' punitive damage
claim.
5.
Defendants have no duty to plaintiffs which
could make them liable for loss of use and
enjoyment or costs of repair or replacement of
plaintiffs1 property.
Therefore, there is not
basis for plaintiffs' negligence and res ipsa
loquitur claims.
5.[sic]
Plaintiffs1 failure to ask for a copy or
written evidence of a "builder's warranty", their
failure to condition their offer to purchase the
Home on the existence of a "builder's warranty" or
on the receipt of an acceptable inspection report
especially in light of Robert Maack's professional
training, clearly shows, and a reasonable jury
could not find otherwise, that plaintiffs did not
exercise ordinary, reasonable diligence.
(Emphasis added.)

It is respectfully submitted that the findings by the

Court are "factual" findings not "legal" findings and that the Court has
usurped the role of the jury on these issues.
In short, the Court has ignored existing Utah case law and treated
factual issues as legal issues; the Maacks are entitled to reversal on
all counts.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
HOAGLAND AND RESOURCE MISSTATE THE NATURE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS BELOW IN A DUPLICITOUS ARGUMENT THAT
THE MAACK PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT FACTS IN THE
RECORD TO THE TRIAL COURT.
Hoagland
insufficient

and
facts

Resource

Design

in the record

cannot

to support

claim

that

the Maacks'

there

are

arguments

against the dismissal of the Maacks' claim for relief based upon the
implied warranty of habitability.

Hoagland's and Resource Design's
5

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs1 Second and Third Claim for Relief (R. 5759), in which the implied warranty of habitability was addressed, was a
Motion pursuant to U.R.C.P. 12(b). 1
Hoagland and Resource Design, however, argue that they placed each
and every element of the First Amended Complaint factually into dispute
and demonstrated that there was no factual support for any element.2
They would

have

this Court

believe

that

their

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment presented to the District Court was based upon the fact that
Hoagland's and Resource Design's workmanship was acceptable, as opposed
to shoddy and negligent, and that there was no damage to the Maacks in
the form of leaking roofs, decks, etc., and crumbling exterior stucco.
A careful examination of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
1428-30) and Defendants1 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 1431-1512) both filed by Hoagland and Resource Design on
March 25, 1992, dispels any such ill-conceived notion.

The only thing

Hoagland and Resource Design presented to the District Court in their
Motion for Summary Judgment were the following issues, the first five of
which were purely legal arguments and only the last of which was based
upon the facts of the case:
1.

Economic losses cannot be recovered utilizing a tort-based
claim and therefore the First Claim For Relief in plaintiffs1
First Amended Complaint must be dismissed.3

1
Court Proceedings Transcript Volume I (the argument and
the District Court's decision were based primarily upon legal
arguments, with some minor undisputed facts being conceded during
the argument).
2

Hoagland?s and Resource Design's Brief at 16-20.

3

R. 1435-1443.
6

2.

The Second Claim For Relief

in plaintiffs1

First Amended

Complaint stating a "strict liability" claim "is deficient on
its face."4
3.

The Third Claim For Relief seeking a declaratory judgment on
the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in
reality is not a claim for relief at all.5

4.

Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief fails to state of action
for intentional or negligent misrepresentation.6

5.

Plaintiffs' punitive damage claim fails as a matter of law.7

6.

There is no factual or legal basis for any claim against Mr.
Hoagland individually.8

As can be seen from the preceding and a review of the Defendantsf
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the first five
arguments presented are entirely legal arguments claiming that from a
legal

standpoint,

regardless

of

the

facts,

recovery

cannot

not

maintained on the claims presented in the First Amended Complaint.

The

only issue raised in HoaglandTs and Resource Design's Motion for Summary
Judgment that was factually based was whether there was any evidence to
support a conclusion that Hoagland was the contractor on the project.
Substantial evidence was mustered to refute that proposition, including
but

not

limited

to

the Standard

Form

Agreement

Between

Owner

and

Contractor, which specifically lists Hoagland as the contractor for the

R. 1443.
5

R. 1446-47,

6

R. 1447-49.

7

R. 1449-51.

8

R. 1451-54,

project,9

The remaining arguments are no different from the arguments

presented in Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's initial U.R.C.P. 12(b)
Motion obtaining the dismissal of the implied warranty of habitability
claim.

For example, Hoagland and Resource Design argued that in Utah a

plaintiff, as a matter of law, cannot maintain a negligence claim for
"economic damages."

They conveniently, however, failed to cite to the

District court the dispositive Utah case holding that economic damages
are recoverable in Utah:
P.2d 482 (Utah 1981). 10

W.R.H.,

Inc.

v.

Economy

Builders

Supply,

633

consequently, after discussing that particular

issue from a legal standpoint for approximately eight pages in the
defendants1 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and
citing

cases

from

Arizona,

California,

Idaho,

Illinois, Missouri,

Washington, and case interpreting federal law, they failed to mention to
the District Court a Utah Supreme Court case directly on point on this
particular issue.
Hoagland and Resource Design argue that Point I of the Brief of
Appellant reads like an argument in opposition to a U.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)
motion.

Their Brief goes on to argue as follows:
To establish a
plaintiff must show:

prima

facie

case

of

negligence

the

(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) the causation, both
actually and proximately, of injury; and (4) the suffering of
damages by the plaintiff.
Williams

v.

Melby,

699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).

While Resource Design's Motion for Summary Judgment on
the negligence claim was primarily based on the lack of the
duty and breach of duty elements, Maacksf Brief completely
fails to meet the burden of proof concerning the all essential
elements of their negligence claim. It contains not a single

See
10

Exhibit "F" to the Brief of Appellants.

R. 1435-43.
8

citation to any evidence in the record which they claim
supports their negligence claim. Maacksf Brief, pp. 5-8.
Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's Brief at 19-20.
The

deception

in

this

duplicitous

argument,

which

grossly

mischarachterizes the proceedings before the District Court, can easily
be dispelled by reviewing what Hoagland's and Resource Design's counsel
of record, Mr. Frankenburg, was saying to the District Court on exactly
the same issue:
Mr. Larsen: Basically, the other objection that we have is
that all of the statements of fact that we had in our
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment
are not included in the Rule 52 Statement, and they should be.
Those are material facts.
They should be taken virtually
verbatim out of our memorandum.
The 52 Statement, for
example, does not include a statement that defective work
existed in the house, defective work that Hoagland and
Resource Design were responsible for.
The Court:

Response?

Mr. Frankenburg: Obviously, whether there was defective work
or not is an issue and was disputed throughout this case. The
fact is that, as I have stated earlier, all that needs to be
included in the Rule 52 Statement are those grounds, those
undisputed facts and those grounds upon which the Court relied
in granting summary judgment, not plaintiffs' argument.

Mr. Heyrend: No, you Honor, I think that's clear. My view of
the 52 findings is that that's what the Court found,
undisputed, is the basis of the Court's ruling, and it should
be included.
If not, it should be amended as the motion's
raised. I don't think there was an issue that work was not
defective, however. I think both Mr. Jarvik - - D r . Jarvik and
Hoagland conceded that, in effect, it was defective, but had
grounds for not being responsible for that defective work.
Mr. Larsen: That's basically the only way the court could
rule. You would have to assume that the work was -- even if
they said it wasn't, you would have to assume it was
[defective] in the context of your ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.
Mr. Frankenburg: I don't think it is really material, because
our motion did not go to the issue you have whether there were
defects or were not defects. Our motion was based upon those
arguments that were set forth in our memoranda, and they did
not go to the issue of defect of lack of defects. It has been

9

clear throughout this case we have denied the existence of any
defects.
Court Proceedings Transcript Volume IV at 149-51 (R. 2470-72) (emphasis
added).

Hoagland

and

Resource

Design

intentionally

grossly

mischarachterized the positions they embraced in the District Court.
For the first time on appeal, Hoagland and Resource Design suggest
that they placed into issue the totality of the case, requiring the
Maacks to present evidence of Hoagland?s and Resource Design's shoddy
and negligent construction practices and the damage that those practices
caused.

This simply was never an issue Hoagland or Resource Design

raised before the District Court, and it is not something they can raise
for the first time on appeal.11
Only
Opposition

after
to

the

Maacks

Hoaglandfs

filed

and

the

Resource

Plaintiffs1
Design's

Memorandum

Motion

for

in

Summary

Judgment (R. 1970-89), in their Reply Memorandum of Defendant Resource
Design and Timothy Hoagland

in Support of Their Motion for Summary

Judgment (R. 2059-72), 12 did Hoagland and Resource Design for the very
first time raise their claim that they owed no duty to the Maacks.13
Raising an issue for the first time in a Reply Memorandum obviously is

11

1989).

E.g.,

Marchant

v. Park

City,

771 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah App.

12

See Point I entitled Defendants Owe No Duty to Plaintiffs
to Compensate Them for Alleged Defects in Plaintiffs' Home
(R. 2060-65).
13
Hoagland and Resource Design also argue that their
"Motion for Summary Judgment was primarily based upon duty and
breach of duty elements . . . . " Hoagland's and Resource Design's
Brief at 20. The "duty" issue, however, was something they raised
for the very first time in the Reply Memorandum of Resource Design
and Timothy Hoagland in Support of Their Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 2059-72).

10

improper.

Ignoring that impropriety for a moment, however, it becomes

abundantly

clear that

the only arguments on negligence

and

strict

liability Hoagland and Resource Design presented to the District Court
were solely legal arguments.

Never, anywhere did they claim that there

was some deficiency in the Maacks ability to prove the allegations of
the First Amended Complaint or throw the underlying facts into dispute.
HoaglandTs and Resource Design's argument that insufficient facts
were mustered in opposition to their Motion for Summary Judgment also is
dispelled by the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

Hoagland and

Resource Design argue that merely citing to a deposition transcript in
support of a disputed or undisputed fact contained in the opposition to
a motion for summary judgment is improper.

Utah Code of Judicial

Administration Rule
4-501(2) reads as follows:
Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points
and authorities in support of a motion for summary
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a
concise statement of material facts as to which
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and
shall specifically refer to those portions of the
record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion.
The
points and authorities in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment shall begin with a section
that contains a concise statement of material facts
as to which the party contends a genuine issue
exists.
Each disputed fact shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically
refer to those portions of the record upon which
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable shall
state the numbered sentence or sentences of the
movant's facts that are disputed.
All material
E.g., White v. Kent Medical
Center,
Inc.,
61 Wash. App.
163, 810 P. 2d 4, 8 (1991).
The Maacks objected to Hoagland and
Resource Design raising that issue for the very first time in their
Reply Memorandum.
Additional Authority and Objection to
Defendants1 Raising Duty Issue (R. 2099-110).
11

facts set forth in the movantf s statement and
properly supported by an accurate reference to the
record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted
by the opposing party's statement.
Obviously, the purpose of this rule is to avoid cluttering the Court's
files with

deposition

transcripts.

Not

on

a

single

occasion

did

Hoagland or Resource Design challenge the accuracy of any of the Maacks
factual assertions or the support of any citation to a deposition
transcript.

Raising that type of argument for the first time on appeal

is disingenuous.15
Hoagland and Resource Design then go on to argue that the points
made in the Argument section of the Brief of Appellant also are required
to contain citations to the record.

To the contrary, the only citations

to the record that are necessary are citations in support of facts in
the Statement of Facts section in an appellate brief.

To suggest

otherwise would require redundant, repetitious citations that would
serve only to lengthen the briefs of the parties.
POINT II.
HOAGLAND AND RESOURCE DESIGN SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO
THE SAME LIABILITY FOR THEIR NEGLIGENT ACTS AS ALL
OTHER MEMBERS OF SOCIETY; THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED A
SPECIAL
EXEMPTION
BECAUSE
THEY ARE
BUILDING
CONTRACTORS.
It is the basic policy of this and every other state that every
person be responsible for the consequences of his negligent acts.16
Hoagland and Resource Design are not entitled to a special exemption due
to their status as building contractors.

15

E.g.,

Marchant

v. Park

City,

A number of courts have so

111 P. 2d 677, 682 (Utah App.

1989).
16

E.g., Cooper v. Bray,
148 Cal. Rptr. 148, 582 P.2d 604,
612 (1978) (California Supreme Court In
bank).
12

For example, in Moxley

held.

v.

Laramie

Builders, Inc.,

600 P.2d 733

(Wyo. 1979), the Wyoming Supreme Court stated as follows:
A builder of a home is also liable for damages
which are foreseeable and which are caused by his
negligence, to subsequent purchasers of such a home
with whom he has no contractual relationship even
though his work is accepted by the first owner
before the damages becomes manifest.
Id.

at

736.

Cosmopolitan

Likewise,

Homes,

Inc.

the Colorado

v. Weller,

Supreme

en

Court

banc

in

663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983), reversed

the law in Colorado since 1955, holding that the subsequent purchaser is
entitled to maintain a negligence cause of action against the builder.
Id.

at 1045.

their

A builder's liability, like everyone else's liability for

negligent

conduct,

should

be

limited

by

the

concepts

of

foreseeability and the applicable statute of limitations or statute of
repose.

In this case, it was certainly foreseeable by Hoagland that

Jarvik might do exactly as he did, have a job change requiring him to
move out of state and sell the residence.

It was foreseeable on

Hoaglandfs part that his negligent construction practices resulting in
serious

defects

purchaser.

in the home

would

cause

damage

to

a

subsequent

The District Court erred in concluding that as a matter of

law the Maacks were not entitled to maintain the negligence cause of
action on any set of facts.
POINT III.
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SQUARELY HELD THAT ECONOMIC
DAMAGES ARE RECOVERABLE UNDER A NEGLIGENCE THEORY.
W.R.H.,

Inc.

v.

Economy

Builders

Supply,

633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981),

puts to rest the issue of whether economic damages can be recovered
utilizing a tort-based theory.

Hoagland and Resource Design make an

effort to distinguish the W.R.H. case by suggesting that it is factually
different from the instant case, claiming the W.R.fJ. involved an action
13

commenced

by

a

purchaser

of

manufacturer of the siding,17

plywood

against

the

retailer

and

While the Maacks purchased more than

simply plywood, that type of factual distinction is vacuous at best.
What Hoagland and Resource Design ignore is that the facts of the case
W.R.H.

are not controlling.

stands

for the broad

principle

that

concepts of negligence are appropriate to protect a purchaser from
economic loss.

Further, there is nothing in the W.R.H. case that

indicates a requirement of privity of contract in order to receive the
benefits of being protected by the application of classic negligence
concepts to protect a purchaser from economic losses.

Privity would

unduly restrict negligence concepts, would blur the distinction between
the two, and is not a requirement

under Utah

Law.18

Further, as

Hoagland and Resource Design are well aware, privity has been long
abandoned as an element of tort-based causes of action.
The

W.R.H.

case

also

recognized

the case

authority

cited

in

Hoagland's and Resource Design's Brief and specifically rejects both
that case authority and its reasoning.
Contrary to Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's assertion, the quality
of

the work

they

were

obligated

to perform

was not "defined and

established by the construction contract with Jarvik."19

As matter of

fact, Mr. Hoagland in his deposition took exactly the opposite position.
He claimed that the contract was altered, allowing him to deviate from
the application of synthetic stucco to exterior of the residence.

If

the Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor,20 which
17
18

Hoagland's and Resource Design's Brief at 28.

E.g.,
(Utah 1974).

Milliner

v.

Elmer

Fox & Co.,

529 P. 2d 806, 808

19

Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's Brief at 29.

20

Attached as Exhibit F to the Brief of Appellants.
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incorporates by reference the plans and specifications,21 controls, then
Hoagland clearly breached the duty he owed to Jarvik and to subsequent
purchasers by applying cement-based stucco rather than acrylic stucco to
the exterior of the residence.
Applying

concepts

foreseeability,

of

negligence

limited

by

the

and having claims for relief based

doctrine

of

upon negligence

further limited by the applicable statute of limitations and statute of
repose do not, as Hoagland and Resource Design contend, create some
nightmarish

unlimited

contractors.

extension

of

liability

for

builders

and

It merely allows the second purchaser and first occupant

of a home, such as the Maacks, to be protected to the same extent as
anyone

simply

operating

an automobile

on the

streets.

To

accept

Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's argument would expose to economic chaos
second buyers, who were the first occupants of a home and, therefore,
the first individuals capable of detecting latent defects that only
manifest themselves after an extended period of time. For no principled
reason, it would insulate negligent contractors who engaged in shoddy
building practices, including building practices in violation of the
Uniform Building Code.

It would encourage builders to convey property

to buyers through a strawman so that there liability to the buyer was
extinguished.

Builders and contractors should be subject to the same

tort law that governs everyone else's conduct.

Attached in part as Exhibit G to the Brief of Appellants.
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POINT IV.
THE APPLICATION
OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF
HABITABILITY TO THE FIRST OCCUPANT OF A HOME IS
NECESSARY
TO
PROTECT
UTAH
HOMEOWNERS
FROM
EXPENSIVE, SHODDY BUILDING PRACTICES.
In their Brief, Resource Design and Hoagland argue that the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Wade v.

Jobe,

818 P. 2d 1006 (Utah 1991),

recognizing a cause of action for breach of an implied warranty of
habitability

in residential

leases, should

purchase of residential homes.22

not be extended

to the

Resource Design and Hoagland assert

that tenants require more protection than home purchasers because they
have an ongoing relationship with the landlord and are usually dependant
on the landlord for repairs and maintenance.

Additionally, Resource

Design and Hoagland claim an implied warranty of habitability would pose
"unlimited

liability"

to builders if home purchasers could

enforce

Resource Design's and Hoaglandfs arguments are

implied warranties.

simply a plea to the Court to perpetuate the rule of caveat emptor and
insulate

builders

from

liability

for

latent,

serious

defects

in

residential home construction.
In JoJbe, the Court rejected

a similar argument by residential

landlords and adopted the common law implied warranty of habitability
for residential leases. Id.

at 1010. Although the relationship between

landlord and tenant may differ from those between builder and purchaser,
the policy interests articulated in Jobe

are no different than the

policy interests supporting adoption of the common law implied warranty
of

habitability

in

favor

of

purchasers

of

residential

homes.

Originally, the implied warranty of habitability in other states was
adopted in the context of purchaser, not lessee.

Resource Design's and Hoagland!s Brief at 38-40.
16

The purchase of a family home is perhaps the single most expensive
investment made by family members. Although a renter can relocate if an
apartment contains latent defects affecting its habitability, a home
purchaser faces the possibility of financial ruination if the family
home contains latent defects requiring major repairs.

As in JoJbe, the

ordinary purchaser of a residential home is dependant on the honesty and
skill of the builder because the purchaser may lack the knowledge,
capacity, or opportunity to ensure that the home being purchased is in
a safe condition and free of latent defects.

Id.

at 1010.

In essence,

the implied warranty of habitability in residential homes serves to
protect innocent purchasers and hold builders accountable for their
work.23

This result is "[c]onsistent with prevailing trends in consumer

law, products liability law, and the law of torts . . . ."

Id.

Resource Design and Hoagland baldly assert that even if the Court
adopted the implied warranty of habitability in the sale of residential
homes, the Maacks should be deprived of the warranty because they lack
privity of contract with the builder.24

Although there are states that

retain the antiquated concept of privity of contract in the context of
the implied

warranty

of habitability,

the majority

view

rejects a

privity requirement and holds that subsequent purchasers are entitled to
the protection of the implied warranty of habitability for a reasonable

Although Defendants make much of the fact that the Maacks
should have obtained a home inspection, their argument ignores the
fact that the seller's agent represented that there was a "builders
warranty." More importantly, this type of argument is merely an
effort to maintain the rule of caveat emptor and shift
responsibility for a builder's construction errors to the purchaser
or the builder's real estate agents. In the last analysis, this
type of argument is simply an effort to distract the Court from the
issue of whether Utah should adopt the implied warranty of
habitability in residential homes.
24

Resource Design's and Hoagland's Brief at 41.
17

length of time.

E.g.,

Moxley

v.

Laramie

Builders,

Inc.,

600 P.2d 733

(Wyo. 1979 ). 2 5
Significantly, the Maacks were the first occupants of the home.
Even assuming the Court was unwilling to extend the implied warranty of
habitability to subsequent purchasers, the Maacks stand in the same
position as Jarvik with respect to their ability to identify structural
defects in the home.
"subsequent

Even the minority jurisdictions rejecting the

purchaser"

rule

occupants of the home.26

and

extend

the

warranty

to

the

first

Resource Design's and Hoaglandfs arguments

lack merit and should be rejected.
Resource

Design and

Hoagland

also claim

that

adoption of

the

implied warranty of habitability will impose "unlimited liability" on
builders for up to fifty years after construction of the home.
argument is absurd.

This

Contrary to their hyperbole, the courts that have

extended the warranty to subsequent purchasers have allowed protection
Moxley

for a "reasonable length of time."

v.

Laramie

Builders,

supra.

It is clear that a reasonable length of time can be determined by the

E.g.,
Keyes
v. Guy Bailey
Homes, Inc.,
439 So.2d 670
(Miss. 1983); Richards
v. Powercraft
Homes, Inc.,
139 Ariz. 242,
678 P. 2d 427 (1984); Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co. , Inc.,
264 Ind. 227,
342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); Redarowlcz
v. Ohlendorf,
441 N.E.2d 324
(111. 1982); Hermes v. Stalano,
181 N.J. Super 424. 437 A.2d 925
(1981); Gupta v. Rltter
Homes, Inc.,
646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983).
Blagg
v. Fred Hunt Company,
Inc.,
612 S.W.2d 321 (Ark. 1981);
Terllnde
v. Neely,
271 S.E.2d 768 (S.C. 1980); Elden v.
Simmons,
631 P.2d 739 (Okl. 1981); Lempke v. Dagenals,
547 A.2d 298 (N.H.
1988); Sewell
v. Gregory,
371 S.E.2d 82 (W.Va. 1988) see Anno.,
10
A.L.R.4th 395 (1981).
26
E.g.,
(1972); Duncan
1978).

Gay v. Cornwall,
v. Schuster-Graham

6 Wash. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371
Homes Inc.,
578 P.2d 637 (Colo.
18

applicable statute of limitations or statute of repose.
v.

Churko

Construction

Co.,

Inc.,

E.g., Woodward

687 P.2d 1269 (Ariz. 1984). 27

Similarly, Resource Design and Hoagland assert that the Maacks
should have obtained a home inspection which would have potentially
revealed the latent defects at issue. This argument, however, is merely
an effort to maintain the rule of caveat emptor and shift responsibility
for major construction errors to the purchaser.
Finally, defendants urge the Court to adopt a rule that denies home
purchasers protection of the implied warranty of habitability unless (1)
the builder-vendor is a commercial builder; and (2) the unit is built
for sale rather than personal occupancy.

As a threshold matter, this

rule of law appears to be a creature unique to the law of Washington.
Moreover, to the extent defendants suggest the home purchased by the
Maacks was not "built for sale," their argument is misleading and wrong.
This part of the rule refers to builders who occupy a home prior to
sale, which is not a factor in this case.28

27

Although Defendants cited Woodward v. Churko
Construction
Co., Inc., supra,
as direct authority for the proposition that the
implied warranty of habitability does not extend to subsequent
purchasers of residential homes, the Arizona Supreme Court, in
Woodward, reaffirmed its decision in Richards
v. Power Craft
Homes,
Inc.,
139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427 (1984), holding that the implied
warranty of workman-like performance and habitability "runs to
subsequent purchasers of the residence." Woodward,
687 P. 2d at
1271.
28

(1976).

E.g.,

Klas

v.

Gockel,

87 Wash. 2d 567, 554 P. 2d 1349
19

POINT V.
LIMITATIONS ON A BUILDER'S "DUTY" AND "THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY" AS APPLIED TO SUBSEQUENT
PURCHASERS SHOULD BE RATIONALLY LIMITED BASED UPON
WHETHER THE BUILDER WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DESIGN
OR CONSTRUCTION DEFECT, UTILIZING THE PRINCIPALS OF
THE SO-CALLED "GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE."
In addition
applicable

to limiting

statute

of

a builder's

limitations

and

liability

statute

of

based

upon the

repose,

it

is

reasonable to rationally limit the builder's liability utilizing the socalled

government

contractor's

defense.

Basically,

the

government

contractor's defense is that where a contractor builds a product in
accordance with government specifications and something goes wrong with
the product or it does not work, as long as the contractor complies with
the specifications, he is not liable.29
A.

Is the Contractor Responsible for the Design?

Obviously, certain home builders will build homes in accordance
with the owner's specifications.

If a builder complies with an owner's

specifications and design, he should not be liable for any subsequent
problems with the home, absent a defect in a construction method or
material.

If there is a defect in the construction technique or in the

materials

utilized

by

the

contractor

(assuming

he

selected

the

materials), then the builder should be liable because those items are
within the scope of his control and responsibility.

29
Boyle v. United
Technologies
Corp.,
487 U.S. 500, 512
(1988) (liability for design defects in military equipment cannot
be imposed when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise
specifications;
(2)
the
equipment
conformed
to
those
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about
the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the
supplier but not to the United States).

20

B.

Did the Builder Select the Materials or was He Responsible for
the Construction Technique?

If the builder selected the materials or was responsible for the
construction technique, then he owes a duty to subsequent purchasers who
foreseeably will be injured by the utilization of improper materials or
improper

construction

techniques.

Just

like all other members of

society, the builder should be responsible for his negligent conduct.
C.

Utilizing a Builder/Vendor Distinction is Not Rational.

Two different parties can buy a home for exactly the same price,
the first a custom built according to the owner's specifications and the
second purchased from a builder/vendor, who selected the design and
built the house.

If both parties sell to a subsequent purchaser who

discovers latent defects caused by improper construction practices in
violation of the Uniform Building Code, there is essentially no rational
distinction to limiting the concept of duty and the implied warranty of
habitability so the that each are applicable only to the house built by
the builder/vendor.

If the builder is not responsible for the design,

then the subsequent purchaser should not be able to recover from the
builder.

If the builder, however, is responsible for the selection and

utilization

of

improper

materials

or

for

improper

construction

techniques, then both the concepts of duty and the implied warranty of
habitability should extend to the subsequent purchaser.

A subsequent

purchaser who suffers from a defect due to a construction technique by
a builder -- and the builder in both the custom built home and the track
home would be responsible for that defect -- the subsequent purchaser
should be able to recover for the contractor's negligence and should be
able to recover under the implied warranty of habitability.
The concepts of "duty" and the "implied warranty of habitability,"
as well as other implied warranties such as the implied warranty of good
21

and workmanlike construction, should be limited utilizing the rationale
of government contractor defense.

The Warranty Deed Jarvik gave to the

Maacks conveyed to them title to their property "together with all the
. . . . ff3°

appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto belonging

This language from the statute coveys all "privileges" from Jarvik to
the Maacks.

Consequently, if there is any limitation on either "duty"

or any implied warranty, that limitation should be imposed based upon a
critical

analysis,

not

some

arbitrary

distinction

such

as

builder/vendor.
POINT VI.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON THE MAACKS' MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SEEKING THE DISMISSAL
OF A PORTION OF HOAGLAND?s AND RESOURCE DESIGN'S
COUNTERCLAIM IS NEITHER CORRECT NOR MOOT.
For Hoagland and Resource Design to maintain a cause of action
based upon implied contract, there must be evidence of a contractual
relationship between the parties.
issue,

with

the Maacks?

This matter was placed squarely into

argument

based

upon

Hoaglandfs

deposition

testimony that his expectation of payment was not based upon anything
the Maacks said or did, but was really his own "hope."

Given that

testimony, there is no basis for a finding of a "meeting of the minds,"
which

a

prerequisite

for

the

finding

of

a

contract

between

the

parties.31
In the event that this Court reverses the District Court's Order
granting Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's Motion for Summary Judgment,
then Resource Design and Hoagland

undoubtedly will resurrect

meritless counterclaim, having previously only dismissed

30

their

it without

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1943).

31
B&R Supply
1216, 1217 (1972).

Co.

v.

Bringhurst,
22

28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P. 2d

prejudice.
would

On remand, therefore, the District Court's prior ruling

remain the

"law of the case."32

Unless Resource Design and

Hoagland, therefore, are willing to unequivocally state that they have
no intention and will not resurrect their meritless Counterclaim upon
remand, then this issue is not moot.
Further,

Hoagland!s

Counter-Claim

establishes

that

Hoagland

contends that there was a contractual relationship between the Maacks,
on the one hand, and Resource Design and Hoagland, on the other.

If

Hoagland is believed, this contractual relationship required Hoagland to
do certain repair work.

He did not do this work, entitling the Maacks

to recover all subsequent costs of remedying Hoaglandfs failed attempts
to cure the defects in the residence.
POINT VII.
THE MAACKS PROPERLY PLEAD THEIR STRICT LIABILITY
CLAIM AGAINST HOAGLAND AND RESOURCE DESIGN.
The allegations contained in the Second Claim for Relief in the
First Amended Complaint are that the components of the residence are
defective, e.g., stucco, adhesive, etc.

Hoagland and Resource Design

properly point out that the District Court dismissed this claim for
relief for failing to state a claim as a matter of law.33
upon

Hoaglandfs

and

Resource

Design's

factually

Based solely

unsupported

legal

arguments,34 the District Court concluded that Hoagland and Resource

32

1981).
33

E.g.,

Major

v.

Benton,

647 F.2d

110, 112 (10th Cir.

Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's Brief at 32.

34

Defendant? s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 1431-543) cites no facts in its Statement or
Undisputed Facts (R. 1432-35) to support this position that
Hbagland and Resource Design were not sellers or manufacturers
and
the argument is confined to a claim that the Maacks1 Second Claim
for Relief fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
(R. 1443-46).
23

Design "were not sellers or manufacturers of a product."

Even though

not required to do so, the Maacks, nevertheless, submitted substantial
evidence

demonstrating

sellers of a product.

that

Hoagland

and

Resource

Design

were

the

The standard form of agreement between owner and

contractor36 establishes that Hoagland

and Resource Design were the

sellers of the component parts comprising the home, such as the stucco,
drains, roof, etc.

The Court should not forget that, in this as well as

all other instances, all inferences in this motion must be drawn in
favor of the Maacks.

Consequently, Hoagland and Resource Design are in

no different position that Armco Steel occupied in the Ernst
Inc.

v.

Armco

Steel

Co.,

601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979).

W.

Hahn,

Hoagland and

Resource Design even concede that Resource Design "is a corporation
engaged

in

the

general

construction

contracting

business

and

Mr.

Hoagland is the President of the corporation."37
Further,

the conclusion

can certainly

be drawn

that

it was

Hoagland who designed and selected various components of the home, such
as the stucco, membranes, drains, etc.38
Hoagland's

and Resource Design's claim

that

the home was not

"unreasonably dangerous" belies the very nature of the defects.
entire exterior of this home was dilapidated and crumbling.

The

The only

inference that can be drawn at this stage of the proceedings is that

Rule 52 Statement of Grounds and Order Granting Defense's
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs, If 1 at 5 (R. 2216).
36

Exhibit "F" to the Brief of Appellants.

37

Hoagland?s and Resource Design's Brief at 34, citing as
support R. 304, 1493 & 1514.
38
Hoagland and Resource Design made no argument and raised
no facts to support a contrary position. Rememberf the attack was
leveled against the allegations in the Second Claim for Relief on
the First Amended Complaint attached as Exhibit "3" to the
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(R. 1476-89).
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condition is "unreasonably dangerous." It was unreasonably dangerous to
the same extent as the roof in the Hahn case.
Resource Design and Hoagland attempt to reintroduce the "economic
loss" limitation into the area of strict liability.

Obviously, the

cause of action and the damages recoverable are separate issues.
W.R.H

Further, although Santor

case puts this issue to rest.

Karagheuslan,

Inc.,

The

v. A&M

207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965) did not involve a building,

it was cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court39 and clearly
allowed

for

the

liability theory.

recovery

of

economic

damages

utilizing

a

strict

Given the W.R.Jf case and the fact that the Utah

Supreme Court in that case cited Santor

with approval, a conclusion that

economic loses are not recoverable under strict products liability would
be a strained reading of existing, controlling authority from the Utah
Supreme Court.
POINT VIII.
HOAGLAND AND RESOURCE DESIGN NEVER PROPERLY RAISED
ANY ISSUE RELATING TO MAACKSf "DILIGENCE."
Defendants'

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

(R.

1428-30)

and

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
1431-1512) do not raise any issue concerning the Maacks' diligence.
Hoagland and Resource Design do not even raise it belatedly in the Reply
Memorandum

of

Defendants' Resource Design

and

Timothy

Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 2059-72).
they cite Klas

v.

Van

Wagoner,

829 P.2d

Hoagland

in

Nowhere did

135 (Utah App. 1992).

In

response to this issue, raised by Hoagland and Resource Design for the
first time on appeal, the Maacks incorporate by reference Point IV of
the Appellants' Reply to Jarvik's Brief.

39

n.14.

W.R.H.,

Inc.

v.

Economy
25

Builders

Supply,

633 P.2d at 45

Further, the Court should keep in mind that the Maacks? so-called
diligence

or

more

properly

termed

"negligence,"

when

utilized

by

Hoagland and Resource Design as an affirmative defense, is not a total
or complete defense, as it may be against a recovery based on unilateral
mistake, the context of the Klas
Maacks?

v.

Van Wagoner

negligence claim against Hoagland

case.

Rather, on the

and Resource Design, the

Maacks negligence is only a bar to recovery in the event that it exceeds
50% of the parties1

total negligence.40

Further, as a defence to

products liability, misuses is the only defense, and in that situation
pure comparative principals apply with no fifty percent limitation.41
CONCLUSION
By not addressing any particular issue Hoagland or Resource Design
raised, the Maacks do not intend to waive that issue, but believe that
the arguments set forth in the Brief of Appellants adequately addresses
it.

For the preceding reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment entered

in favor of Hoagland and Resource Design and against the Maacks should
be

reversed,

with

instructions

that

further

proceedings

be

held

consistent with this Court's opinion.
DATED:

March 8, 1993.
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS

MarJ^ A. Larsen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Robert D. Maack and Judith D. Maack
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41

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1986)

Mulherln
(Utah 1981).

v.

Ingersoll-Rand
26

Co.,

628 P.2d 1301, 1303-04
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124 West 60th Street
New York, New York 10023

c:\wp51\data\maack\hoagland.rpy.mdd

27

ADDENDUM

28

Tab A

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
168
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action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

TabB

CONVEYANCES

57-1-12

57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect.
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form:
WARRANTY DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to
(insert name),
grantee, of
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
day of
,
19
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights and privileges
thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from all
encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives
will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs and
assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such covenants may be briefly inserted in such deed following the description of the
land.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1981;
C.L. 1917, § 4881; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-1-11.
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GARY B. FERGUSON (A1062)
KURT M. FRANKENBURG (A5279)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendants
and Third-Party Plaintiffs
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
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TTTnTriAT, DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. MAACK ;rd JUDITH
MAACK,

RULE 52 STATEMENT OF GROUNDS
AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS

vs.
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual,

Civil No. 900903201CV

Defendants.

RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Utah corporation,
and TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual.
Third-Party I'l.u "i i i I i
vs.
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D.
Third-Party Defendant.

1

Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Resource

Design & Constructioi
March i1'
i

1992, came

Timothy Hoagland

t

for hearing before the Court, pursuant to
. Robert D. Maack was

)

present representing himse I I « in Il '
Mar*

Larser

" " i| » " »•"»" » ' h\

Plaintiff Judith

'ichael

ill i 1,

represented by

Heyrend and Robert

Defendant

Resource Design & Construction, Inc. ("Resource Design
Timothy Hoagland were represented by counsel, Kurt M. Frankenburg
I l1.! i I I i.i,in1 !" Iiiiii!

li'""ftfendant J a r v i k a p p e a r e d p r o s e

participated telephonicall

hearings.

r

Defendant Eagar & Company was represented by counsel, Paul D.
reviewed
motions, memoranda and supporting materials filed by the parties,
having considered the arguments presented
g o o d c < i i i! :i e < i j 11 > e i i: • il i: in ; j

\t* tearing, and

lie :i < t s <• J ! s ii I :; ;

grounds:
There i s no genuine dispute with respect to the following
material facts:
1.

Defendant Resource Design & Construction, Inc.

("Resource Design") has been a Utah corporation in good standing
since approximately

Resource . . . j.

construction contracting, primari]

areas

custom

residential homes and light commercial buildings.
2.

Plaintiff Robert

practice law in
Statu

| !!III , Ill 11.,
3.

State of utan, and has practiced law

the

years.

In early 1986 E i : Robert Jar\ i k (defendant and

party defendant) approached Resource Design

> request that

I -, )[ >p

build

personc

x n

juaive

s>a±Lm

City.
I

farvik subsequently contacted a professional house

designer.

Dr. Jarvik presem

wanted to build to the house designer who then assisted Jarvii
p
5.

On o r a b o u t 3 ill ) II # . Il 9 8 6.,

I il:, = .s :::

standard form agreement between owner and contractor with Dr.
3 mi

in I

1

6.

in , I i ill I I

in I in n i n e

for

Jarvik.

Resource Design completed const,

one year later

, Jarvik was very

sa

Resource Design and made final

payment and acceptance under the construction contract.
7.

Due to a job change, Dr
.

CJL'J

,

Jarvik moved from Salt Lake

,

consequently

listed the completed home for sale.
8.

Dr. Jarvik arranged to have someone live

through

w:£nter

for

period of time
9.

the home

-ented

home

t;ne summer

On July ?ft, IMIIH plaintiffs Robert and Judith Maack

contacted the list
at ti

coking

house, entered intt
asking pric*

Earnest Money Sales Agreement for

-^ Earnest Money Sales Agreement

specified that plainwithout any warranties < : *

m II

I mi

"

s"

condition.

f)f,023 4

1n

O n , J111 >' .' '

i' 1 ( 1 1 n • i l

I ' 11111

i

I - i r "i' in I

ni I mi ni i 11

ni ni I accepted uiie

Earnest Money Sales Agreement.
urchasing t h e home, plaintiffs did n o t have a
general contractor, professional inspec i

,

, '

I «-• e

inspect t h e Home on their behalf,
i fts claim they were informed by Maclyn
Kesselring of Eagar that there w a s *
covering t h e Home, plaintiffs did
evicleiii it

1 II

for any written

II! 11 I Il i « . .uir i .•iiiiri

*

reference to a builder's warranty

they include any

the Earnest Mone^

Agreement.
13.

A. _

Money Sales

Agreement they first learned that t h e house h a d been built

v

Resource Design & Construction, Inc.
1

.

I

I i

nesign

Hoagland came o: . r about August
I ] a :! r

**

u-, ,vc6, when Mr. Hoagland sent

on t h e stationery oi "'Resource Design &

Construction, Inc. ••
15.

After closing on the house and moving in, plaintiffs

ask en I h1*" iiiiiii i Desigi

perform certain work

home.

After Resource Design performed subt

'

home, plaintiffs refused to pay for the work done.
16.

I"!.ii ! in, i ". First Amended Complaint alleges claims for

negligence, strict liabil- -v

rp«;

1

misrepresentation against defendants Resource Design and
Hoaglai : , ::i
4

P l a i n t J i i s t i n in I i II i i in I lln ill MI I m i l i m I

i MI I I m l

between them and defendants Resource Design or Timothy Hoagland.
BASED UPON the above undisputed facts, the Court concludes
as follows:
Defendants were not sellers or manufacturers of a
basis for plaintiffs' strict
liability claim.
Plaintiffs failed to establish any facts indicating
ill I
otherwise

1

11 I i

I

-"representations of fact or

Therefore, there i •• ITM basis for plaintiffs'

negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation claim.

detrimental reliance by them upon alleged representations by
defendants.

Therefore, there is no basis for plaintiffs'

negligent andy

II JMIIIII HI i Il

Because there JS no basis for plaintiffs' intentional
misrepresentation claim, there can be and is no basis
plaintiffs' punitive damage claim.
5.
them

Defendants have

to plaintiffs which could make

oss of use and enjoyment

costs of repair or

replacement u plaintiffs' propert
basis

>

plaintiffs' negligence and res ipsa loquitur claims.
5*

Plaintiffs' failure 1

- written

evidence of a "builder's warranty5
their offer * purchase the Home on the existence of a "builder's
VJI.II

if

I 'j,

acceptable inspection report,

(K".':j|h

especiali
clearly shows, and a reasonable jury could not find otherwise,
7

fs did not exercise ordinary, reasonable diligence.

BASED UPON the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the Mot
for Summary Judgment filed by Resource Desigii & Construction,
foagland on each and every claim
asserted against them by plaintiffs.
DATED this

/ 7

day <_:

l ^ ^ / ^ ^

, 1992.

/hy THE cot
< <

HONORABLE PAT B. BRlAtf
District Court Judge

^•°r#«j\

5ATNA.0009U3332

6

n r ooi 7

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Mary C. Wardell, being duly sworn, sa ys that she is employed
iii the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendants
and third-party plaintiffs Resource Design & Construction, Inc.
and Timothy Hoagland herein; that she served the attached RULE 52
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS in Case No. 900903201CV
before the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, upon the parties listed below by placing a true
and correct copy thereof In an envelope addressed to:
Robert K. Jarvik, M.D. (Via First Class Mail)
124 West 60th Street
New York, New York 10023
Robert D. Maack (Via Hand Delivery)
Mark A. Larsen
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Paul n

Newman, Esq. (via Hand Delivery)
SNELL & WILMER
60 E. South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake rit-v. Utah 84111

Michael R. Heyrend, Esq. (Via Hand Delivery)
310 E Street
ake City, Utah 84103
and causing the same to , mailed first class, postage prepaid,
or personal?v Kand-delivered, as indicated above, on thp
day of Mav - ">

t-lOfdt^
Maw

n

< Wardell

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this JSl

day of May,

1992
Notary Public ^
•
SHARON M.ALLHANDS \
? - 7 c~.-r ^ - ~ - t Suite 500 I
' - h 84145,

Residing in Salt Lak
County, State of Utah

I- -J^'i

